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[Crim. Nos. 10330, 10563.

In Bank.

Apr. 23, 1968.]

In re WILLIAM CAMERON on Habeas Corpus.
(Two Cases.)
[1] Habeas Corpus-Existence of Other Remedy-Exceptional
Cases.-Habeas corpus is available to challenge violations of
constitutional rights relevant to the determination of guilt if
the petitioner presents an adequate excuse for failing to invoke his remedy by appeal.
[2] Id.-Grounds-Writ as Substitute for Appeal-Fear of Death
Penalty.-Fear of receiving the death penalty Oll a retrial
excuses a failure to appeal for purposes of state habeas corpus.
[3] Id.-;'Grounds-Writ as Substitute for Appeal-Fear of Death
Peruilty.-One convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment was not precluded from seeking
relief in habeas corpus to challenge violations of his constitutional rights leading to his conviction, where, although it was
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 13; Am.Jur., Habeas
Corpus (1st ed § 22).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 7 (5); Criminal
Law, §1019; [2,3] Habeas Corpus, §12(3); [4] Reference, §17;
(5] Criminal Law, § 471; Homicide, § 111; [6] Criminal Law,
§ 1382.1; Homicide, § 262; [7-9] Criminal Law, § 467; [10) Criminal
Law, § 1080(2) (b); [11] Criminal Law, § 1382.1(10); [12) Criminal
Law, § 1382.1(12); [13) Criminal Law, §§ 104(4),1451; [14] Crimillal Law, §§ 104(4),1457.
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concluded by earlier reference that for motives nnspecified he
personally abandoned his appeal, it appeared from the record
before the referee that a substantial factor for the decision to
do so, jointly made by defendant, his father and his counsel,
was the fear of a possible death penalty on retrial.
[4] Reference-Report and Findings-E1fect.-Although a reviewing court is not bound by the findings of a referee, they are
entitled to great weight.
[5a, 5b] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confessions-Sufficiency of
Evidence-Voluntariness.-A murder suspect's taped statement to the police within two hours of the crime was voluntary,
where, although he was only 22, had had no previous experience
with the police, was not advised of his rights to counsel and to
remain silent, was emotionally distraught and obviously intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .18 percent, he was
nevertheless generally coherent, appeared rational, and was
responsive to questions put to him, and where, moreover, he
effectively resisted indicating what his questioners sought,
namely, any real memory of the details of the killing.
[6a, 6b] Id.-Appeal- Reversible Error - Confessions - Involuntarily Made.-A murder suspect's confession at a psychiatric
examination arranged by the prosecution and two taped confessions to the police, all made within 21 hours of the crime,
were involuntary,. and prejudicial under any constitutional
standards, especially on the issue of the degree of the crime,
and their introduction into evidence was therefore reversible
error, where, although the suspect was coherent, rational and
responsive to questions put to him, he was, according to expert
testimony, substantially under the influence of a massive
(300 mg) dose of the tranquilizer Thorazine given to him when
his blood alcohol level was .18 percent, making him unaware
of the seriousness of the charge, careless of the outcome, and
willing to be led into remembering more and more details of
the crime, some of which did not in fact occur, and where on
prior police questioning his memory h"d been blank.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Circumstances Rendering Confession Involuntary.-A confession is not the product of a
rational intellect and a free will, and is therefore involuntary,
if the petitioner's will to resist confessing is overborne.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Circumstances Rendering Confession Involuntary.-If an accused's will is overborne because
of impairment of his ability to exercise his rational intellect
and free will, such as by drugs, insanity or pressures engen[6] Use or administration of drugs or narcotics as affecting admissibility of confession, note, 69 A.L.R.2d 384. See also Cal.Jur.2d,
Evidence, § 422 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 577, 578.
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dered by physical or psychological coercion, it is immaterial,
in the context of the involuntariness of a confession made
under such circumstances, whether that impairment was caused
by police, third persons, the accused himself, or circumstances
beyond anyone's control, nor is it material that the officers
pursued no improper purpose in eliciting the confession or that
the facts related by the accused in such confession are true.
[9] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Circumstances Rendering Confession Involuntal')'.-The only issue in the voluntariness of
a confession made in an interrogation in which the accused's
will may have been overborne, is whether the accused's ability
to reason or comprehend or resist were in fact so disabled that
he was incapable of free or rational choice, and to determine
this issue, the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation must be considered.
[10a, lOb] Id.-Appeal-Necessity for Objection-Evidence-Exception Where Confession Involuntal')'.-Where a confession
was involuntary as a matter of law, a defendant is not preeluded, by his failure to object at the trail, from raising the
issue for the first time either on' appeal or in a habeas corpus
proceeding brought after an ~cusable abandonment of his
appeal.
[11a,llb] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Confessions-Effect of
Earlier Statements.-In a murder trial in which four of defendant's extrajudicial statements were introduced in evidence,
error in admitting the last two was not. rendered harmless by
the existence of the others, wbere evidence of his memory of
the events was crucial to the critical issue of the extent of his
intoxication and state of mind at the time of the killing,
where, in the first statement, he, clung emphatically to his total
lack of memory, where, even assuming the second statement
had been admissible, his memory of the events was restricted to
the barest details, and where it was only in the last two statements that he purported to remember many more details, which
had, in fact, been supplied to him by the police, and his
memory of which, if real, was devastating to his defense.
[12] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Confessions-Effect of Other
Confessions.-Generally, the introduction into evidence of an
unconstitutionally obtained confession compels reversal regardless of other evidence of guilt, and the exception to that
rule in the case of a confession obtained in violation of
Escobedo-Dorado is restricted to where there is also in evidence
an equally or more damaging admissible confession made before the inadmissible confession and thus there was no danger
that the former was the product of the latter; such exception
is in no event applicable when the admissible evidence does
not include any equally damaging confession.

i:
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[13] Id.-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial-Evidence-Suppression:
Disposition of Cause-Discharge.-If the police or prosecution
lose, defltroy, or otherwise make unavailable vital defense evidence, they may disable the statc from ever giving defendant
n fair trial and thus lead to his discharge rather than remand
for new trial.
[14] Id.-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial-Evidence-Suppression:
Disposition of Cause-Remand After Reversal.-Loss by the
prosecution, in the course of a murder case, of a plaid shirt
and of a color film depicting the interior of the trailer in whieh
the victim was killed did not entitle defendant to a discharge,
as distinguished from remand for retrial, despite reversal of
his judgment of conviction for constitutional errors on other
grounds, where there was no actual suppression of evidence,
and where, as a substitute for the color film, black and white
photographs were available to the defense depicting the same
areas in better detail, where the shirt had heen identified as
belonging to the victim, and where, therefore, neither item
would have' aided the defense in any material manner.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody on the ground of involuntariness of confessions given
under the influence of a drug. Writ granted arid petitioner
remanded to custody of superior court for a new trial.
George T. Davis, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws, Roger
E. Venturi and Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-After two trials in which the jury
disagreed, a third jury in 1959 found William Cameron guilty
of murder in the first degree and fixed the penalty at life
imprisonment. Cameron has filed two petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that involuntary confessions were
introduced into evidence and that the prosecution deliberately
suppressed evidence indicating that he was innocent. The two
proceedings have been consolidated.
The Attorney General contends at the outset that habeas
corpus is not an available remedy on the ground that Cameron
could have raised the contentions now urged on an appeal
from the judgment but failed t.o do so. Although Cameron
filed a timely notice of appeal, he failed to prosecute the
appeal and on October 28, 1960, the Court of Appeal dismissed
it. Cameron points out, however, that at that time there was a

Apr. 196B]

IN BE CAMERON
[88 C.2d.487; 87 Cal.Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 833]

/~)

491

substantial risk that had he secured a reversal of the judgment
on appeal he would have received the death penalty on retrial,
for it was not until November 1963 that this court overruled
People v. Grill (1907) 151 Cal. 592 [91 P. 515], and held that a
defendant who successfully appealed from a judgment imposing life imprisonment for first degree murder could not be
given the death penalty on retrial. (People v.· Henderson,
(1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d
677].) Cameron contends that the risk that he might receive
the death penalty on retrial excuses his failure to pursue his
remedy by appeal and that he acted with reasonable diligence
to secure relief after the Henderson case was decided. l
[1] Habeas corpus is available to chaUenge violations of
constitutional rights relevant to the determination of guilt if
the petitioner presents an adequate excuse for failing to
invoke his remedy by appeal. (People v. Trewa,' (1966) 64
Ca1.2d 141, 143-144 [49 Cal.Rptr. 100, 410 P.2d 620]; In re
Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 406 [46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d
33]; In re Shipp (1965) 62 Cal.2d 547, 552-553 [43 Cal.Rptr.
3, 399 P.2d 571J.) Although we are not bound by federal
standards in determining what constitutes an adequate excuse
for failing to invoke the remedy by appeal, we have recognized
the relevance of the federal habeas corpus test that permits
denial of relief "to an applicant who has deliberately
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts." (Fay v.
Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 438 [9 L.Ed.2d 837, 868, 83 8.Ct.
822] ; see In re Shipp, supra, at p. 554; In re Sterling (1965)
63 Cal.2d 486, 489 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5] ; People v.
10n September 29, 1964, Ca,meron filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the United States District Court. On December 11, 1964, that petition
was dismissed because Cameron had failed to exhaust his state remedies.
On December 23, 1964, Cameron filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Solano County Superior Court. The court denied the petition
on February 5, ] 965, on the ground that "Petitioner's proper forum is
the . . . Court of Appeal whether his prayer for review by that tdbunal
be for reinstatement of his appeal, for issuance of a writ, or both such
remedies." On February 23, 1965, Cameron moved to recall the remittitnr
and reinstate his appeal in the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate
District. That court appointed a referee to take evidence on stated
questions and thereafter on Deeember 6, 1965, denied Cameron.'s motion
OR the ground that he had personally abandoned his appeal. Cameron then
petitioned for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District, the appellate court having territorial jurisdiction to grant
the writ, and that court denied his petition on February 9, 1966. On
August 18, ]966, Cameron filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
this court alleging the use of involunt.ary confessions at his trial, and on
October 31, 1966, he filed a supplemental petition raising the issue of
suppression of evidence.
.
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Treloar, supra, at p. 144.) [2] Since the United States
Supreme Court held in Fay v. N oia that fear of receiving the
death penalty on retrial precluded finding that a failure to
appeal was a deliberate bypass of a state remedy, we conclude
that such fear also excuses a failure to appeal for purposes of
state habeas corpus. (See In re Shipp, supra, at pp. 555-556.)
[3] The question remains whether Cameron was in fear of
the death penalty. In an earlier proceeding to determine
whether or not to reinstate Cameron's appeal (see footnote 1,
ante), the Court of Appeal ordered a reference directed to the
question whether Cameron expressly or impliedly approved
abandonment of his appeal, and thereafter it concluded that
he personally abandoned the appeal. Although the reference
was not directed to Cameron's motive for so doing, it appears
from the record made before the referee that fear of the possibility that Cameron might receive the death penalty on retrial
was a substantial factor in the joint decision of Cameron, his
father, and his counsel to abandon the appeal. Accordingly,
we conclude that Cameron's abandonment of his appeal does
not preclude his seeking relief in these habeas corpus proceedings.
From the record of Cameron's trial, it appears that Vivian
Malone was killed and badly mutilated in her trailer at a
trailer court on December 22, 1958, between 11 p.m. and
11 :50 p.m. Cameron and his friend, Glenn A. Becker III, testified to the events preceding the killing. Both young men were
students at Chico State College; each was married and had a
baby. Both lived at the trailer court. Earlier in the day, Mrs.
Malone had invited Cameron and his wife for a drink. They
declined the invitation at that time but stated that they would
accept at a later time.
The Camerons had invited the Beckers to a taco dinner. The
Beckers arrived about 6 :30 p.m. During dinner, between about
6 :30 and 8 p.m., Cameron drank about two quarts of beer. The
Beckers returned to their trailer after dinner. Shortly thereafter, Becker came back to the Cameron trailer and he and
Cameron decided to buy some stout. Between 8 p.m. and 9 :30
or 10 p.m., Cameron drank seven or eight CaIlli of· stout.
Cameron then suggested to Becker that they go to Mrs.
Malone's trailer to accept her invitation for a drink.
Vivian Malone was a 50-year-old woman who lived alone.
She answered the door clothed in a bathrobe and invited the
men in. She had been drinking most of the day and was
intoxicated. She brought out a bottle of whiskey, and each

.J
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took a tumbler fuJI, appr()ximately two and Hm,e·fr}urths
ounces of whiskey, diluted only by one ice cube. As they
talked and drank, the conversation turned to sex. Mrs. Malone
indicated her willingness to have sexual relations with both
men. but both declined.
Cameron testified that he poured himself two more drinks
and that he did not know whether Mrs. Malone or Becker had
any more to drink. He testified that he had no independent
recollection of Becker leaving. He also testified that Mrs.
Malone asked him to leave, that he stated he wanted to finish
his drink, and that she began to call him foul names. He then
recalls being kicked in the groin, but does not remember who
kicked him.
He further testified that he remembered nothing that
oceurred after being kieked in the groin except for vague,
fragmentary and disoriented recollections of the following
specific faets: He recalled being on his hands and knees and
seeing a body Ilnd some blood. lIe remembered Hit! iug 011
Beeker's doorstep. He remembered sitting in a ear and hear.
ing someone say that there had been a killing. He remembered
being in a room, being interrogated by one of the poliee
officers and Assistant Distriet Attorney Mulkey, and being
told that he had killed a woman and severed her breast. He
recalled being taken to a hospital and being given a shot. He
remembered talking to two psyehiatrists and being in the
offiee of a polygraph operator, Mr. MacVarish. He remembered that Mr. MacVarish stated that Mr. Mulkey would not
be pleased with the results of the tests and that they would
have to be done over. He remembered being interrogated. His
memory of all events following the time Mrs. Malone began
calling him foul names was very vague and fragmentary.
Becker confirmed Cameron's account of the evening until
Beeker left Mrs. Malone's trailer about 11 p.m. He also testified that Cameron appeared at Becker's doorstep about
11 :50 p.m. He appeared to be dazed, and told Becker that lIP
thought he had killed Mrs. Malone. Beeker saw blood on
Cameron's white jacket and went over to the Malone trailer,
where he saw enough to know that something was wrong.
Beeker then took Cameron to the Cameron trailer and telephoned the poliee, who arrived within a matter of minutes, at
midnight. They placed Cameron under arrest almost immediately, after being advised by Becker that Cameron was the
man they were looking for.
Cameron was placed in a squad car near the Malone trailer

)
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where he waited for about five or ten minutes. During this
time, the officers were taking pictures of the interior of the
trailer and the area surrounding it. Assistant District Attorney Mulkey had been called to the scene, and viewed the
interior of the trailer. He was told the general details of the
killing, including the fact that Mrs. Malone's dog and cat had
been killed. Actually, the cat was unharmed.
Mr. Mulkey and one of the police officers then drove
Cameron to the Chico police station. Mr. Mulkey noted that
Cameron appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, and
therefore had him examined by a physician at the police station. The physician gave Cameron physical coordination tests
and took a blood sample. The blood sample indicated that
Cameron had a blood alcohol level of .18 percent. The physician and Mr. Mulkey both concluded, however, that Cameron
was mentally competent for interrogation. Cameron was given
fresh clothing by the police and Dlay have been questioned
before a tape recording 2 of the interrogation was made, beginning at 1 a.m. The tape was made without Cameron's knowledge and he was not advised of his rights. At the end of the
taped interrogation, Cameron became hysterical and despondent and asked the police to shoot him. l<'earing that Cameron
might become suicidal, Mr. Mulkey ordered that he be taken
to Butte' County Hospital and placed on a mental hold.
Cameron arrived at the hospital about 3 :20 a.m.
The attending physician at the hospital, Dr. Swinderman,
placed Cameron under heavy sedation without knowing that
he llad a high blood alcoholleveI of approximately .18 percent
and without examining him. He acted upon a nurse's observations of Cameron and the story told her by the police that
Cameron had recently committed a murder, was agitated, and
was in danger of harming hhnself. Cameron was sedated by
an injection of 300 milligrams of Thorazine (chlorpromazine)
at approximately 3 :30 a.m. on December 23. The normal
2'l'he poliee and :Mr. Mulkey dellY that Camet'on was interrogated
hefore tile tape recording was started. At the end of the first tape, however, the following appears:
.
•• (CAMERON): Sheriff, you said take it easy. Thllt's right, you've had
your borne you call go home to your wife and your baby. I can't. You
keep put[ting) me through this. Wby do you keep put[t.iJlg] me through
this . . . You want to see me • . . go through it all . . • time nnd . . .
time over and • . . oyer again" (Ma. MULl{EY): TlIis is the first time you've u:!ell through it, Dill.
"(CAMERON): This is the second time I been through it-the Captain
knows and you know!
• • (:MR. MULKEY): All we wnut is the trutb, Bill."

i
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initial dose is 25 to 50 milligrams,S and Thorazine is contraindicated for persons who are under the influence of alcohol
because of the potentiating interaction between alcohol and
Thorazine. Cameron was then' placed in a padded cell containing only a mattress. The hospital report states· that at
3 :45 a.m. he was still sobbing loudly, but by 4 a.m. he was
sound asleep. He remained sound asleep until awakened so
that Mr. Mulkey could take him to DeWitt State Hospital.
At 9 a.m. on December 23, Cameron was taken from the
hospital, given breakfast, and driven to D~'Vitt State Hospital for a psychiatric examination. Mr. Mulkey accompanied
him, and stated that Cameron dozed and slept on tIle trip.
'Vhen they arrived at DeWitt, Mr. Mulkey told the two
psychiatrists the information he had about the crime, and,
because he had been misinformed, told them that Cameron
had been sedated by sodium amytal 4 at Butte County Hospital. The interview was conducted at 11 a.m. It was not taped,
but th(' two examining physicians testified that they had taken
notes. They testified that Cameron's speech was slow and
slurred, and that he held his head in his hands as if he were
suffering from a hangover. The physicians also testified t1lat
in response to their questions Cameron confessed and stated
that lle remembered killing Mrs. Malone and performing one
of the mutilations but did not remember anything else. Thr
interview lasted 20 minutes.
Cnm('ron was then taken by Mr. Mulk('y and a police officf'r
to the Criminal Interrogation and Identification Bureau I1t
Sacramento, where they arrived at approximately 1 :30 p.m.
He dozed and slept in the car on the way. An expert trained
in the use of the polygraph as an interrogation technique
int('rviewed him using that technique until 3 p.m. Mr. Mulkey
had told the expert the infonnation he had about the crime SIl
that the operator could use that information in his interrogation of Cameron. At the end of Cameron's session with tllf'
polygraph operator, Mr. Mulkey conducted another interro!!l13Dr. Swinderman testified that he ordered the large dose partly heeause he hlld been told the patient might hann himself, but largely for
the protection of the stllff that might have to go into tIle J'oom wh('f('
Cruneron was lllllced. From what he had been told about tIle natul'e of
Cumeron'8 crime, he was quite concerned for the safety of his staff.
4Sodium amy till is a hypnotic sedative. It puts people to slecp. Rnd
Cameron been unacl' the influence of the sedath'e tlle doctors thought he
bad becn givcn, hc would lwve b('en incol,cl'cnt or aslecp. Accorrlingly.
wben they iutcn'icwed him, they thought all of thc sedlltion was out of
his ~ystem. They attribued the mental and phYHical retal-dation noted in
him to a hangover.

)
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tion that was taped, and Cameron stated that he was aware
that his confession was being taped. He confessed for the
third time to the murder and mutilation of Vivian Malone,
stating that he remembered the events and recounting them in
greater detail than before.
The same afternoon, about 4 p.m., Mr. Barr, an attorney
retained by Cameron's father, telephoned Sheriff Gillick of
Butte County from Yreka and advised him that he had been
retained to represent Cameroll. The sheriff told Mr. Barr that
Cameron was in Sacramento. Mr. Barr testified that he told
the sheriff not to take any further statements from Cameron
until M.r. Barr could gct to Chico, and that he was coming to
the county jail. He further stated that Sheriff Gillick told him
that they already had their statements. Mr. Barr testified that
he then advised the sheriff that unless he could have an assurance that no further statements would be taken until he could
get down to .Chico, he would call Mr. King, a local attorney,
to see Cameron, and that the sheriff indicated it would not be
necessary to call Mr. King. Sheriff Gillick acknowledged that
Mr. Barr had called him, but denied that he was told not to
take further statements. Cameron was not told that any attorney had been retained for him.
Cameron was returned from Sacramento to the Butte
County jail at Oroville. He dozed and slept on the way, and
arrived at 6 p.m. He was given a change of clothing and
dinner. He was then taken to the police jail at Chico, where
he was again interviewed, and his fourth confession was taped
without his knowledge at 8 p.m. In this confession, Cameron
stated that he remembered the events concerning the killing
and described what allegedly occurred in much greater detail
than in any of the earlier confessions. When Mr. Barr arrived
in Oroville on the night of December 23, 1958, he was told
that Cameron had been taken to Chico. Mr. Barr telephoned
the Chieo jail and was informed that Cameron was under
sedation and was asleep in his cell. Mr. Barr saw Cameron for
the first time the morning of December 24.
We appointed a referee to tnke evidence and make findings
on the question whether each of the taped confessions and the
confession to the physicians at De Witt State Hospital were
voluntary and on the question whether any evidence favorable
to the defense had been lost or suppressed.
The referee held hearings and heard testimony. He received
in evidenee a complete transcript of the third trial, the transcripts of the first and second trials to the extent they were

)
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available, and the tape recordings of the first, third, and
fourth confessions.
With regard to the first confession, the referee found that
although Cameron's speech was slurred, indicating that he
was under the influence of alcohol, and that he was emotionally distraught, he was coherent and his answers were
rational and responsive to the questions he was asked. Based
upon that standard, he concluded that the first confession was
voluntary. He found that Cameron was rational and coherent
during the second and third confessions, that Thorazine did
not impair an individual's ability to answer questions. and
that an individual under the influence of Thorazine had the
ability to make a choice whether to answer questions. He
therefore concluded that these confessions were voluntary. He
found that Cameron was not threatened in any manner during the fourth interrogation, and that Mr. Barr did not ask
Sheriff Gillick for an assurance that no further interrogations
would be had until lir. Barr had an opportunity to consult
with Cameron. He concluded that the fourth confession was
voluntary, and stated that even had such assurance been
given, the fourth confession was voluntary.
[4] Although we are not bound by the findings of the
referee, they are entitled to great weight. (In re Imbler
(1963) 60 Ca1.2d 554, 562 [35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6].)
We adopt the referee's finding that Cameron's statements
in all four interrogations were rational, coherent, and responsive to the questions asked him. We conclude, however, that
the referee erred in using the coherence, rationality, and
responsiveness of Cameron's answers as the controlling criterion of their voluntary character. [5a, Sa] We conclude
that Cameron's first statement was voluntary, but that the
second, third, and fourth statements were involuntary. Since
those statements were clearly prejudicial under any of the
standards that have been applied in reviewing constitutional
error (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17
L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824]; Payne v. A.rkansas (1958)
356 U.S. 560, 568 [2 L.Ed.2d 975, 981, 78 S.Ct. 844]), particularly on the issue of the degree of the crime, the judgment
must be set aside.
Since the effect of alcohol is different from that of Thorazine or a combination of both, we sha'l consider the first taped
confession separately from the confessions obtained after
Cameron had been given Thorazine.
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[7] A confession is involuntary unless it is "the product
of a rational intellect and a free will." (Blackburn v. Alabar/HI (1960) 361 U.S. 190, 208 [-1 L.Ed.2d 242, 249, 80 S.Ct.
274] ; Daris v. NUI·tlt Cal'o/ina (1966) 384 U.S. 737, 739 [16
L.Ed.2!l 895, 897, 81l s.n. 171l1].) It is not the product of a
rational intelleet and a free will if the petitioner's will to
resist confessiJig is oWI·borne. (Rogers Y. Hichmond (1961)
365 U.S. 534, 544 [5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768, 81 RCt. 735] ; Peoplc
v. Keichel (1963) 59 CaI.2t1 503, 520-521 [30 Cal.Rptr. 538,
381 P.2d 394] ; People v. Lope.'< (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 223, 248 [32
CaI.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16].) [8] An aecused's will can be
overborne by pressures eng('ll(leJ'ed by physical or psychological co('rcion on the part of law enforcement officers (Rogers v. Richmond, supl'a; People v. Lopez, supra), or by the
influence of a dmg (Tou,nsend Y. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293,
308-309 [9 hEd.2d 770, 782-783, 83 S.Ct. 745]) or insanity
(Blackburn y. Alaballla, slIpra) that impairs his ability to
exercise his rational intellect and free will. If an accused's
will is overborne because of impairment of his ability to exercise his rational intelll'ct and free will, it is immaterial
whether that impairment was caused by the police, third
persons, thc aeeused himself, or ('ircul1lstances beyond anyone's control. (Townsend v. Sain, supra.) Nor is it material
that the officers pursued no improper purpose in eliciting the
confession (Blackburn v. Alabama, supra) or that the facts
related by the accused in such a confession are true (Rogers v.
Richmond, supra). [9] The ouly issue is whether the
accused's abilities to reason or comprehend or resist were in
fact so disabled that he was incapable of free or rational
choice. (1'ow1Isend v. Sain, supra.) To determine this issue,
the "totality of circumstances" (Reck v. Pate (1961) 367
U.S. 433 [6 L.Ed.2d 948, 81 S.Ct. 1541] ; Fikes v. Alabama
(1957) 352 U.S. 191, 197-198 [2 hEd.2d 246, 250-251, 77
S.Ct. 281] ; Payne v. Arkansas, supra, at p. 567 [2 L.Ed.2d at
p. 980]) surrounding the interrogation must be considered.
[5b] Petitioner was 22 years old, llad lived a model life,
and had had no previous experience with the police. (Cf. Reck
v. Pate, S1tpra, at p. 442 [6 L.Ed.2d at p. 954] ; compare, Stein
v. New York (1953) 346 U.S. ]56, 185-186 [97 hEd. ]522,
1542-1543, 73 S.Ot. ]077].) He was not advised of his rights
to counsel, to remain silent, or to refuse to incriminate himself. (Davis v. North Carolina, supra, at p. 740 [16 L.Ed.2d at
p. 897); Haynes v. Washington (1963) 373 U.S. 503, 510-511
[10 L.E<1.2d 513, 518-519, 83 S.Ct. 1336]; Cllloinbc v. Con-
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nccticut (1961) 367 U.S. 568, 610 [6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1062, 81
S.Ct. 1860] ; Turner v. Pennsylvania (1949) 338 U.S. 62, 64
[93 L.Ed. 1810, 1813, 69 S.Ct. 1352, 1357].) The tape of tIle
first interrogation shows that he was obviously intoxicated
and emotionally distraught. His blood alco]lOl level at the
commencemcnt of the tape was .18 percent. Whcn he broke
down and became hysterical near the end of the first tape,a
Mr. Mulkey had him taken to Butte County Hospital and
placed on a mental hold for fear he would take his life. When
he arrived at the hospital, his emotional state was such that he
was diagnosed a schizophrenic. He was overcome with horror
by the killing and his assumption that he had done it.
Both Mr. Mulkey and the physician who examined him
pefore he was questioned concluded, however, that he was
rational, physically coordinated (compare Unsworth v. Gladden (D. Ore. 1966) 261 F.Supp. 897), and sufficiently mentally alert to answer questions. The tape indicates that,
although his speech was slurred and he had obvious difficulty
pronouncing certain combinations of words, he understood the
questions asked him and was responsive to them. Although he
occasionally rambled on irrelevant subjects, he was gl'nerally
coherent, appeared rational, and volunteered many details
concerning the events of the day up to the point where Mrs.
Malone began calling him foul names. Dr. Catton, a defense
expert on the effect of alcohol on the body, testified at the
trial that the degree of influence alcohol is exerting upon an
individual can be measured, to a certain extent, by the coherence, rationality, and responsiveness of his reactions to his
surroundings. The coherence, rationality, and responsiveness
of Cameron's answers is therefore relevant in determining the
extent of influence that the alcohol was then exerting upon
him.
The most persuasive evidence, however, that Cameron's will
to resist was not overborne during the first interrogation is
that he effectively resisted telling Mr. Mulkey what he sought
to elicit, namely, any real memory of the details of the crime.
At that time everyone, including Cameron, assumed that he
liThe following appears at the end of the first tape:
" (CAMERON): Please get rid of me, Captain.
" (Ma. MULKEY); Well, I'm gonna take you up to bed, Bill. Try to
get some rest.
" (CAMERON): (unintelligible) . . . I don't want to ••. I just want
to . . . Please get rid of me. Just shoot mt:'. Do something. Like I'm a
'scapeu convict or something. Look, I've got, I've got plenty insurance
for my family every thin;; . . ."
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had killed Mrs. Malone. He had already so stated to Becker
and Ii police officer at the scene. The interrogation sQught to
elicit memory of details that would be relevant to Cameron's
mental condition and the degree of the crime. Despite occasional waivering, however, Cameron clung resolutely and
emphatically during this hour-long interrogation to his total
lack of memory of the events in question. We therefore conclude that in spite of his youth and inexperience with the
police, the lack of any warnings of his rights, and his intoxication and emotional turmoil, Cameron's will to resist was
not overborne during the first interrogation.
[6b] Although the coherence, rationality, and responsiveness of Cameron's answers, which were relied upon by the
referee, are material in determining the extent to which
alcohol alone may have impaired his mental facilities, they
shed no light on the effect of the Thorazine that was administered to Cameron before he made the last three statements.
Moreover, during the course of these statements, Cameron
allowed himself to be persuaded by leading questions that he
remembered more and more of th~ details of the crime, including some alleged details that did riot in fact occur.
At 3 :30 a.m., Cameron was given 300 mgs.fl of Thorazine.
Dr. Burbridge, a University of California Medical Center
psychiatrist who specializes in pharmacology and is an expert
on the interaction between Thorazine and alcohol, testified
that the drug was originally developed as a pre-anesthetic
medication to "be given to patients to destroy any anxiety they
might feel about oncoming surgery. The drug affects a person
mentally by reducing the normal anxiety reactions to a point
where he is no longer disturbed by what normally would be
upsetting factors in his environment. " [T]hey get in such a
psychiatric state that input from the environment no longer
disturbs them, and hence under the circumstances here in
which a person should be keyed to the maximum by the surroundings that he is faced with, of being questioned about a
thing that may involve his life, ••. he wouldn't care about
GAil doctors concurred in their opinion that 300 mgs. was inordinately
high for an initial dose. Dr. Burbridge described the effect of .aclministering a 300 mg. initial close of Thorazino to a subjcet with a .18 percent
alcohol blood level as a "cl,'ug·inclueecl lobotomy within reasonable medi·
cal probabilities," Dr. Jackson, one of the prosecution's doctors, described a lobotomy as a procedure during which the anxiety or worry
nerves are s~vered, s:> tJrat messages conveying anxiety or worry are
prevented from reacbing the brain. All doctors concurred in the opinion
that tile pntient's ability to think would not be otherwise impaired to any
gl'CIl t tlcgree.
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it, it wouldn't bother or concern him. . . .7 [T]he type of
state provoked by this . . . drug is such that an individual
would be in a position ... that he doesn't care what happens to llim, that he is not aware that he is being charged
with a serious crime, . . . and it doesn't bother him that he
is, and if the confession must be a free and voluntary one, he
must be keyed to the peak and be able to defend himself,
under such a circumstance."8 According to the testimony of
Dr. Burbridge, Dr. Catton and Dr. Adams, presented by the
defense, and Dr. Jackson and Dr. Swinderman, presented by
the prosecution, alcohol and Thorazine potentiate each other.
In Dr. Catton's words, when the two are put together, "one
and one just isn't two, one and one is three or four." Dr.
Burbridge testified that since the dosage given was inordinately high, petitioner must have been in a borderline shock
condition for many hours after the dose was administered,
since any dosage larger than that normally recommended (25
to 30 milligrams) will reduce blood pressure, cutting the flow
of blood to the brain, and adding to the confusion of the
individual at the time he is being questioned.
Dr. Burbridge also testified that, based upon his experiments, he believed that neither the Thorazine nor the alcohol,
because of the potentiating effect they have upon each other,
would be dissipated from the system within 16 hours 9 from
the time that the Thorazine was administered.
7Dr. Jackson described the effect of Thorazine in the same terms.
8Dr. Burbridge distinguished the reasons that a tranquilizer like Thorazine produces sleep from the reasons that a hypnotic drug would produce
sleep. Tranquilizers and ]Iypnotic drugs operate upon different levels of
the brain. A hypnotic drug will induce sleep because it operates upon the
area of the brain that controls thought pI'ocess and consciousness. An
individual under the influence of a Ilypnotic drug is rendered unconscious.
A tranquilizer, on the other hand, does not operate upon the areas of the
brain that control consciousness, but upon the areas of the brain that
control the reactions of a conscious individual to his environment. 'I'ranquilizers produce sleep by I'emoving the anxiety or worry that is keeping the individual awake. He is then enabled to go to sleep. However,
he can be roused from that sleep and will behave in a conscious manner,
despite the fact that he is still under tile influence of the drug. The drug
is still having the effect of removing the norma] anxiety or worry reactions the individual would have to his environment. With a hypnotic drug,
on the other hand, the fact that the individual is conscious indicates that
he is no longer under the influence of tIle drug.
DDr. Jackson testified that the drug is normally eliminated from the
system within eight hours. It must be noted, however, that this presupposed a normal initial dose, and did not take into account the fact
that the presence of the alcohol in the blood stream would delay by more
.than 50 percent the rate at which the drug was dissipated. The alcohol
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Dr. Burbridge further testified that Thorazine tended to
make a person amenable or agreetlble to the wishes of others,
in the sense that he would become unable to see any reason to
oppose doing what others wished of him. Under the influence
of Thorazine, he would not resist requests made of him by
others. Dr. Catton testified to the same effect.
Dr. Burbridge described the physical symptoms of a person
heavily under the influence of Thoruzine as slowed speech and
short answers. "He won't slur his speech, as when he is
drunk, but whereas without Thorazine he would not only
answer a question but amplify on it, with the Thorazine the
words will come slowly and he would make his answers as
short as possible." Drs. Tipton and Jackson noted mental
and physical retardation and slowness of petitioner's speech
when they interviewed him at DeWitt State Hospital. The
tapes show these symptoms of slowness of speech and shortness of answers, as compared with the more rapid speech and
the more voluble answers appearing from the tape of Cameron's first interrogation.
It thus appears from the overwhelming weight of the evidence that Cameron was substantially under the influence of
Thorazine throughout the last three interrogations and that
his will to resist was destroyed because he was rendered
unable to comprehend the seriousness of his predicament or
the significance to him of acceding step by step to "remembering' '10 the prosecution's reconstruction of his crime. His
would potentiate Thorazine both ill regard to the effect the drug would
have and the length of time during which the subject would be uuder its
influenee.
10All three defense psychiatrists Dr. Catton, Dr. Adams, and Dr. Burbridge, and both prosecution psychiatrists, Dr. Jackson and Dr. Tipton,
agrced that Cameron was suffering true amnesia at the time of tile trial.
They disagreed, however, as to whether his amnesia was primary or secondary. The defense psychiatrists opined that it was primary amnesia;
i.e., that his memory never recorded the occurrences hecaus(' he was in
It dis80ciative state due to patll010gical intoxication at the Hme of the
killing.' The prosecution psychiatrists opined that lie tllllTered secondary
amnesia; i.e., tha.t he was not dissociat.ive when the killing occurre(l
(although they agreed he was pathologically intoxicated at. the time) and
his memory recorded the events, but subsequently blocked out tile memory
because it wa.s too painful. It must be noted t.hat the latter seemed to
base tlleir opinions primarly on the fact that when they interviewed
Cameron on December 23 a.t 11 a..m., he stated tllat he "remembered"
c.ertain of the acts he was told he had committed during his interview
with Mr. Mulkey the night before. The only doctor who examined
Cameron for the specifie purpose of testing his memory wa.s Dr. Adams.
He believed Cameron was suffering prineipally from true primary
amnesia. Part of the examination administered by Dr. Adams eonsisted
of a. sodium pentothol test. Sodium pentothol is a hypnotic drug that is
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confessiuns dllriug those interrogations were not "the product
of a ratiunal inh'lIec·t uJI(I a free will." (Blackbllrn v. .Lllabat/ta, supra, 361 U.S. 199, 208 [4 hEtl.2tl 242, 249, 80 8. Ct.
274] .)
[lOa] The Attorney General eontends, howeyer, that
Cameron's failure to object to the admission of the second
confession at the trial precludes his challenging its admissibility now. [l1a] He further contends that any error in
the trial court's rulings admitting the tllird and fourth confessions into evidence is harmless because the first and second
confessions were properly in evidence. There is no merit in
these contentions.
[lOb] From the record at th~ trial it appears as a matter
of law that the second confession was involuntary. In such a
case, a defendant is not precluded from raising the issue on
appeal even though he did not object in the trial court. (People v. Matteson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 466, 469 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 3!!g
P.2d 161], and cases eited; see also People v. Castro (1968)
257 Cul.App.2d 643, 645-646 [65 Cal.Rptr. 62] ; People v. Rand
(1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 668, 672-674 [21 Cal.Rptr. 89].) Since
Cumeron's abandonment of his appeal is excusable, he may
properly challenge the second confession for the first time in
these proceedings.
Moreover, even if the second confession were deemed
properly in evidence, it would not render harmless the error
in admittillg the third and fourth confessions. [12] Ordinarily, the introduction into evidence of an unconstitutionally
obtained confession compels reversal regardless of other evidence of guilt. (See People v. Powell (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 32,
51-52 [59 Cal.Rptr. 817,429 P.2d 137], and cases cited.) We
have recognized an exception to that rule in the case of a
confession obtained in violation of Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
378 U.s. 478 [12 hEd.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v.
Dorado (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Ca1.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361], when there was also in evidence an equally or more
damaging admissible confession made before the inadmissible confession and thus there was no danger that tlle
former was the product of the latter. (People v. Cotter
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 386, 398 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d
used with amnesics, as it enables the doctor to place the patient in a
drug·induced hypnotic state and discover whether there is a memory
despite tile ll1pntal block. Although the results of the sodium pentothol
test arc not admissible, Dr. Adams testified that his (:iagnosis of true
pl'illlury amnesia was confirmed by the l'esults of the test.
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862], vacated on other grounds (1967) 386 U.s. 274. [18
L.Ed.2d 43, 87 S.Ct. 1035]; People v. Jacobson (1965) 63
Ca1.2d 319, 329-331 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555].) We
need not decide whether this exception may also apply in the
case of an involuntary confession, for in no event is it
applicable when, as in the present case, "the admissible evidence does not include an equally damaging confession."
(People v. Price (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 370, 377 [46 Cal.Rptr. 775,
406 P.2d 55] j People v. Powell, supr{l, 67 Ca1.2d 32, 54.)
[llb] In determining Cameron's criminal responsibility
for the homicide, a critical issue was the extent of his intoxication and his state of mind at the time of the killing. Evidence of his memory of the events was crucial to that issue.
(See footnote, 10, supra.) In his confession to the psychiatrists, Cameron purported to remember only the barest details
of the crime, details that Mr. Mulkey had reported to him the
night before and passed on to the psychiatrists before their
interview. By the time of the third and fourth confessions, the
officers had learned many more details of the crime and had
informed Cameron of them. He purported to remember these
details for the first time in his third and fourth confessions,
and his memory of them, if real, was devastating to his
defense.
Although the judgment must be set aside because of the use
of Cameron's involuntary confessions against him, it is necessary to consider the question of the loss or suppression of
evidence. [13] The police or prosecution may disable the
state from ever giving a defendant a fair trial if they have
lost or destroyed or otherwise made unavailable vital defense
evidence. (See People v. Hall (1964) 62 Ca1.2d 104, 112. fn. 8
[41 Cal.Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700]; In re Imbler, supra, 60
Ca1.2d 554, 567; PeOple v. Carter (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 737, 747
[312 P.2d 665].) If this were such a case, Cameron should be
discharged rather than remanded for a new trial.
[14] The referee found that no evidence was suppressed,
but that two items had been lost. One was a colored film taken
of the interior of the trailer shortly after the arrival of the
• police, and the second was a man's plaid shirt depicted in a
photograph as being under the body's right forearm. The
referee found that the colored film depicted the same areas
shown in black and white photographs, and that the photographs were of better quality than the film. He concluded that
the film would have been merely cumulative of other evidence
available to the defense. He found that the shirt had been
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identified as the victim's by her sister-in-law and would not
have been material to indicate that someone other than Cameron and Mrs. Malone were in the trailer at the time of the
killing. He therefore concluded that neither item would have
aided the defense in any material manner.
The record fully supports the referee's findings and conclusions in this respect, and we adopt them. Accordingly, Cameron is not entitled to be discharged.
The writ is granted. The judgment against Cameron is set
aside and he is remanded to the custody of the Superior Court
of Butte County for a new trial.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I dissent.
There is no question that habeas corpus is a proper remedy
to challenge violations of constitutional rights relevant to the
determination of guilt if the petitioner presents an adequate
excuse for failing to invoke his remedy by appeal. I do not
believe that a valid excuse exists under the circumstances
before us.
The majority adopt a subjective test: what were petitioner's innermost fears, apprehensions and motives at the
time he abandoned his earlier appeal T He is an intelligent
young man, a college student, and was represented by able
counsel of his own choice. It cannot be doubted that abandonment of the appeal was a deliberate step taken after mature
reflection. To presently undertake a search of the deepest
recesses of his mind as of that earlier date in order to fathom
motivation impresses me as a chimerical and futile exercise.
In the absence of some objective manifestation of reasonable
reliance upon erroneous or outmoded legal authority, abandonment of the appeal should preclude granting relief in
these habeas corpus proceedings.
If it be assumed arguendo that some circumstances could
justify relief under the majority's subjective formula, the
writ should nevertheless be denied here.
This petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree
after an exhaustive trial in which he was defended by vigorous and experienced counsel. Two earlier trials had resulted
in jury disagreement. In the first two trials no objection was
made to the introduction of any of the confessions. In the
third trial, no objection was made to the first two confessions,
but only to the third and fourth statements.
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This court held in People v. Matteson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 466,
469 [39 Cal.Rptr. 1,393 P.2J 1G1], that the "introduction of
an involuntary confession or admission requires reversal of a
judgment of conviction despite defendant's failure to object
to its introduction." (Also see People v. Underwood (1964)
61 Ca1.2d 113, 126 [37 Cal.Rptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937].) Categorically stated, that is sound law. But its application is not
invariable.
Not infrequently counsel choose defense trial tactics which
dictate that a statement, even though properly objectionable,
be received in evidence. To permit raising the issue of
admissibility for the first time on llabeas corpus . long after
conviction would place our stamp of approval on strategy of
opportunism. As long ago as People v. Kramer (1897) 117
Cal. 647, 650-651 [49 P. 842], this court said: "It is an obviously just rule that such objection cannot be here made for
the first ti~ne . . . . 'rile defendant cannot remain silent and
take the chance of a favorable issue, and, losing, 'urge as
ground for reversal an error, which, but for his silence, might
never have found its way into the case. His failure to object
justly gives rise to the inference that at the time he saw no
injury being done him, and he cannot complain on being met
here by a barrier arising 1rom his own omission. "
'Vhen· defense counsel raised no objection to the introduetioll of any of the confessions in the first two trials and none
to the first two confessions in the third trial, it must be
assumed this omission was by design. Indeed, there is ample
reason to conclude that not only did counsel deem the statements nonprejudieial but they also believed the manifest
remorse of the petitioner to be beneficial to his cause. Their
maneuver obviously did not fail in the first two trials. Our
role on review is not to second-guess trial tactics, nor to
reward calculated strategy wllieh was ultimately frustrated
below. (People v. Reeves (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 766 [51 Cal.Rptr.
691, 415 P.2d 35].) Y<>t the majority do so when they COIldemn as inadmissible statcments which defense counsel considered properly before the jury. The consequence of the
majority opinion, though not explicitly stated, is to expect a
trial court to reject sua sponte evidence t.o which neither
party offers an objection and which both parties desire in the
record. This is an unreasonably heroic requirement for trial
judges.
I<'inally, the majority undertake to reweigh the facts
anothrr time and to reach a conclusion on the voluntariness. of
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defendant's eonfessions contrary to that of the original trier
of fact, and contrary to the considered findings of the referee
appointed by this court, Judge Perluss of the Sacramento
Superior Court. I would adopt thc facts found and the
conclusions reached by the referee, and I do so in haec verba
(references to the transcripts have been omitted) :
4. The evidence
a. The taped confess-ion made at approx'imately 1 a.m. on
December 23, 1958.
Petitioner's first confession was taped and was made at
approximately 1 a.m. on December 23, 19li8, in the Chico police
station in the presence of a sheriff's captain and a deputy
district attorney. At the commencement of the interrogation,
tile deputy district attorncy smelled the odor of alcohol on
petitioner's breath and requested Dr. Ted Oster, a qualified
medical doctor, to give petitioner a sobriety test. Dr. Oster
conducted various tests including the Romberg test and other
physical tests and determined that petitioner was "mentally
alert. " lIe was of the opinion that petitioner's mind was
working in a "rational manner" and was not under the
influence of alcohol insofar as the drunk driving laws were
concerned despite a blood alcohol count of .18.
The deputy district attorney stated that the petitioner was
lucid and the sheriff's captain indicated that the petitioner
understood the questions he was asked and talked intelligently.
The taped confession was played at the reference hearing.
To the referee it appeared that petitioner's voice was somewhat slurred but his answers were rational and he seemed
coherent. In the middle of the tape petitioner began to cry
and he cried and broke down at the end of the tape. Nevertheless, he was able to answer questions such as those relating to
the residence of his parents, where he went to school, the age
of his child and an' adapter for his camera. Unquestionably,
petitioner was emotionally upset and remorseful but the
referee does not believe that he was irrational and that he
did not exercise his own judgment in making the first
confession.
b. The confession made at DeWitt State Hospital at
approx'irnately 11 a.m. on December 23, 1958.
. After his first interrogation and confession, petitioner was
taken to the Butte County Hospital where he was admitted liS
a mental hold to prevent him from harming IJimself. At
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approximately 3 :30 a.m., Nurse Julia Caton administered 300
mgs. of Thorazine to petitioner at the direction of Dr. Paul R.
Swinderman. Dr. Swinderman did not see petitioner personally and did not know he had been drinking. He testified
that the drug would cause a person under the influence of
alcohol to take a longer time than usual in becoming sober.
At approximately 9 a.m. petitioner was taken to DeWitt
State Hospital in Auburn. He dozed at times en route and had
juice, coffee and doughnuts in the town of Lincoln. Petitioner
arrived at the hospital at approximately 11 a.m. where he was
examined by Drs. Carl Jackson and G. D. Tipton, psychiatrists. The petitioner told the doctors the facts which he
remembered which were a confession of the crime.
The doctors did not know that Thorazine had been administered to petitioner. He appeared to be suffering from a hangover, his clothing was disheveled and he held his head as
though he had a headache. His speech was slow.
Although there can be no question but that petitioner
received an unusually massive dosage of Thorazine, a fair
reading of the evidence establishes that petitioner was able to
exercise his judgment in making his second confession.
Dr. Thomas Burbridge, petitioner's witness, said: " Yes,
one of the characteristics of the, of a tranquilizer is, as compared to an ordinary hypnotic sedative, is what, as a matter
of fact is one of the ways you separate them from an ordinary
hypnotic sedative, like a barbiturate, or alcohol, is that he is
easier aroused. The person will sleep but then if you shake
him and wake him up and put a question to him he will be
able to answer it, or he will be able to, if he could, he is
stimulated enough to playa bridge game, but he will not play
his best game, and his questions will not be answered with
clarity that it ordinarily would be."
Dr. Burbridge also said:
"Q. Now thorazine is a tranquilizer'
"A. Thorazine is a tranquilizer. If a large dose is given,
enough to produce sleep, you will awaken the person. he will
arouse easily, he will answer questions quite well without any
trouble at all.
"Q. Even with a fairly heavy dose 7
"A. With a fairly, with a fairly heavy dose, yes. II
As to the combined effects of alcohol and Thorazine, Dr.
Burbridge, in commenting on the third interrogation of petitioner at 1 :30 p.m., approximately two llOurs subsequent to
the instant confession, testified that he would not state that
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petitioner's free will was destroyed and that he had the
ability to choose whether he would answer questions or not.
A portion of the recross-examination of Dr. G. D. Tipton by
Judge Friedman, petitioner's counsel, at petitioner's second
trial is of interest:
"Q. I see. Well, doctor, let me ask you this: Isn't it a fact
the people who have been given thorazine are readily amenable to suggestion T
•• A. I can't say that they are. I don't know why they
should be.
"Q. Well, neither do I, doctor. It is your opinion they are
not, is that right'
" A. Yes, that is right."
c. The taped confession. made at approximately 3 p.m. on
December 23, 1958.
Upon completion of his interview at DeWitt State Hospital,
petitioner was taken to the Bureau of Criminal Identification
an~ Investigation in Sacramento where he again was interrogated. Two polygraph examinations were run. The referee
pe~mitted limited inquiry of Mr. Joseph F. McVarish, the
then polygraph operator, as to whether petitioner's responses
fluctuated normally for the purpose of ascertaining whether
at that time petitioner was under the influence of alcohol or
Thorazine or both. Petitioner was normally responsive and
was alert and attentive.
This taped confession also was played at the hearing. Petitioner's voice was not slurred and he was able to remember
details of the crime.
The referee believes that petitioner did exercise his own
judgment in making this confession.
d. The confession made at approximately 8 p.m. on December 23, 1958.
Following the interrogation in Sacramento, petitioner was
taken to the Butte County jail in Oroville, arriving at about
6 p.m. At approximately 8 p.m., petitioner was interrogated
and again confessed. This confession, too, was tape recorded.
Petitioner contends that then he was threatened by Sheriff
Gillick who questioned him. The tape confession was played
at the hearing. The referee is unable to find any threats in
manner, tone of voice or in content.
A closer question is presented by petitioner's assertion that
he was questioned after his counsel had informed the sheriff
not to question petitioner without an attorney being present.
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Judge Barr, petitioner's former counsel, was unable to
assist the referee in this regard at the reference hearing. At
petitioner's third trial, however, Judge Barr testified that he
phoned Sheriff Gillick in the afternoon of December 23, and
requested him nut to interrogate petitioner further. Mr. Alexander Camerc;m, petitioner's father, states he heard Judge
Barr make this statement over the telephone.
On the other hand, Sheriff Gillick testified that Judge Barr
asked only where petitioner was and said nothing about statements. Thelma Mosely, the sheriff's secretary, had been
directed to listen to the telephone conversation. She testified
Judge Barr said nothing about statements or interrogations.
After reviewing the conflicting evidence carefully, the
referee has concluded that no restrictive admonition was
given to the sheriff by counsel before petitioner's interrogation. Even if this were not so, the referee believes that the
"rare case'" principle of which Mr. Justice Moskspeaks in
People v. Powell (July 18, 1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 51-55 [59 Cal.
Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137], would be applicable here. It would
be an "Escobedo-Dorado rule" error, and the fourth confession added nothin~ to the three prior confessions heretofore
found to be voluntary.
5. The. alleged suppress-ion of evidence.
The referee also was directed to ascertain whether representatives of the State of California lost or suppressed any evidence, the introduction of which would have been favorable to
petitioner's defense.
The referee finds that no evidence was suppressed. It does
appear, however, that two items have been lost.
The first item was a roll of colored motion picture' film of
the victim's trailer which was lost prior to the first trial. No
evidence was offered to the referee to indicate that the film
would have been favorable to petitioner. To the contrary, the
former district attorney who had viewed the film testified that
the still photographs used at the trials were far better in
clarity.
The second lost item is what appears to be a man's style
plaid shirt depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 5a. The picture
was taken before the body was moved and the shirt was under
the victim's right forearm. The shirt was not produced and
apparently was lost.
The victim's sister-in-law, Mrs. Elsie Robinson, specifically
identified the plaid shirt as belonging to the victim, and,its
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absence was used by petitioner's counsel to suggest that a
person other than petitioner had committed the crime. The
referee cannot find that the lost plaid shirt if produced would
have been favorable to petitioner's defense.
FINDINGS OF FACT

Responsive to the questions propounded by the Court, it is
found:
1. Despite petitioner's consumption of alcoholic beverages,
his taped confession made at approximately 1 a.m. on December 23. 1958, was voluntary.
2. D('spite petitioner's consumption of alcoholic beverages
and the administration to him of Thorazine, his confession
made to the physicians at De Witt State Hospital at approximately 11 a.m. on December 23, 1958, was voluntary.
3. Despite petitioner's consumption of alcoholic beverages
and the administration to him of Thorazine, his taped confession made at approximately 3 p.m. on December 23, 1958, was
voluntary.
4. 'l'he taped confession petitioner made at approximately
8 p.m. on December 23, 1958, was voluntary.
5. No evidence was suppressed or lost by any representative
of the State of California the introduction of which would
have been favorable to petitioner's defense.
I would therefore deny the petition.
McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 22,
1968. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

